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NATO TRANSFORMATION: FINDING RELEVANCE IN COPING WITH THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT OF TERRORISM
It could be said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a greater stake in transformation of the force than the United States. The widening gap between U.S. capabilities and NATO capabilities has almost rendered the alliance useless as a military power or deterrent. In the past 12 years, three regional wars have demanded a collective response; yet the alliance as an institution has been slow to react and fully support operations. Political disagreements over intervention in certain conflicts and the lack of military capability were factors that effected NATO decisions and have led the call for change.
The new asymmetric threats of global terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will require an even greater commitment for change within the alliance. The lack of a modernized military, coupled with the rapid advances made by the U.S. in technology and doctrine has accelerated the danger of NATO's perceived irrelevancy.
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Over the course of the last 10 years NATO has embarked on numerous efforts to change the face of the alliance to include making it look more European. This strategy of enlargement has in some cases exacerbated NATO efforts to transform its military capability. The acceptance of new members from the former Warsaw Pact has burdened the alliance with additional readiness and interoperability problems. Since its inception the alliance has struggled with the challenge of interoperability and compatibility with even the oldest of allies. During the more recent conflicts such as Kosovo and Afghanistan member states experienced numerous communication and interoperability problems. In addition NATO has been slow moving and indecisive when committing to support outside the European community.
Adding to the question of NATO's relevancy is the growing divide in defense spending between NATO countries and the United States. The United States spends over $300bn on defense, with the probability of increasing to over $400bn, while the other members of the NATO alliance only spend $150bn and is in decline. In addition rapid advances in command, control communication, computing, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), precision guided munitions (PGMs) and new sensors, munitions, tactical aircraft and other weapons systems have increased the disparity in capabilities within the alliance.
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The new U.S. defense strategy requires the American force to be smaller, more lethal, and joint in order to fight it's way into a crisis zone and swiftly defeat new asymmetric threats.
Right now the U.S. can deploy to contingency areas almost 3 times faster and strike more lethally than its allies. 3 In order to meet the new challenges brought on by the asymmetric threat of global terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the U.S. has embarked on a rapid transformation of the force. This transformation which is based on joint interdependence and using network centric warfare is adding to the risk of NATO and U.S.
being incapable of fighting together.
So what must NATO do to stem the tide of losing its relevancy as the worlds benchmark alliance? How can NATO transform to meet the challenges of the new threat? This paper will attempt to identify the challenges of transformation and lay out a strategy for NATO to maintain its relevancy as an alliance. Key in this strategy is to define transformation for both the U. S.
and NATO. In addition it is important to look at what transformational changes NATO has made in the past and how effective those changes have been. A look at current operations in Afghanistan will also help identify those key areas that NATO must continue to improve upon in order to maintain its push towards transformation. This paper concludes with identifying the risks for NATO as it embarks on its course of transformation.
DEFINING TRANSFORMATION
The need for transformation was clear before the war in Afghanistan and before September 11 th …What's different today is our sense of urgency-the need to build this future force while fighting a present war. It's like overhauling an engine when you are going at 80 miles an hour. Yet we have no other choice.
President George W. Bush at the Citidel, Dec 11 2001 Some believe that with the United States in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, and to put that new thinking into action." Terrorism has brought to light a new asymmetrical threat that requires transforming the way we think, plan, and fight this new global threat. This threat does not recognize boundaries and is set against destroying the fabric of democratic freedom throughout the world. In order to defeat this threat it will be critical for all free and democratic nations to ally themselves with others that respect and promote the principles of freedom and democracy.
In recognizing this, the leaders of the U. Although U.S. military forces today enjoy significant advantages in many aspects of armed conflict, the United States will be challenged by threat forces that possess or seek capabilities and design novel concepts to overcome our advantages. The trends that will provide adversaries with capabilities and opportunities to do harm to the United States include:
diminishing protection afforded by geographic distance, the emergence of regional threats, growing asymmetric threats, and increasing threats from weakened states and ungoverned areas. Assuring information systems and conducting information operations; and (6) Enhancing space capabilities. Over time, the continued focus of the Department's force transformation efforts on the development of the capabilities necessary to achieve these six critical operational goals will help shift the balance of U.S. forces and broaden capabilities.
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In addition to these six goals U.S. transformation strategy will be anchored by four military around the fundamental tenets of network-centric warfare, and emphasizing high-quality shared awareness, dispersed forces, speed of command, and flexibility in planning and execution, will result in U.S. forces conducting powerful effects-based operations to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives across the full spectrum of military operations. 12 The US will also be required to engage in these processes with NATO in order for the alliance to maintain its relevancy and continue to promote its own transformation.
DEFINING TRANSFORMATION FOR NATO
NATO, an alliance that has struggled to find its way over the past decade, has quickly come to realize that the alliance must transform in order to maintain relevance. Article 4: Upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives. NATO decided to: Whether out of self preservation or the true need for reform, NATO has steadily implemented each of the articles from the Prague Summit over the past 15 months. The fulfillment of these changes will maintain NATO's relevancy and allow the alliance to face the asymmetric threat of terrorism and defeat it, much like it did in facing the Soviet threat during the Cold War.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL AND PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE
One of the most important developments within NATO after the Cold War was the establishment of the North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC). The NACC was designed to allow all European nations, to include non-NATO members, a forum to discuss European issues that may require a NATO response.
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As the NACC achieved success in promoting dialogue the United States saw a further need to expand NATO's influence and laid the ground work for establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PFP).
PFP has been a benchmark policy for NATO. It provides the mechanism for states not comfortable with full membership to work with NATO members to enhance continental security and allow the ascension of countries interested in NATO membership without fully committing to The concept was designed to provide NATO with a flexible means to respond to new security challenges, to include operations involving partners outside of the alliance. The U.S.
provided the catalyst for developing the CJTF concept in NATO. The aims were: to adapt NATO's force structure for new missions; to project security and stability towards the east by giving partner states a way to participate with NATO in crisis response; and to support ESDI by offering a military capability to support security or support operations that concern Europe. This would keep the EU from trying to establish a separate military that would compete with and not compliment NATO. is not apt to fully adopt the CJTF concept. First the existing NATO structure has been streamlined to allow theater command roles to be allocated to major and regional NATO commands. Second SHAPE has already undertaken numerous changes in the wake of IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations in its ability to generate and sustain operations. Third, utilizing the force commander's current staff provides unity of command with command structures and staffs that maintain established SOPs and have the ability to train as a team. Lastly, the standing SACEUR is unlikely to be willing to relinquish overall operational control of a NATO mission. 28 For NATO, the concept of a CJTF HQ is not completely without use. The other potential requirement for a NATO CJTF HQ is to provide a common command structure for purely
European operations in support of ESDI/ESDP obligations. The CJTF HQ may provide the political means for gaining cooperation of non-alliance European forces when NATO is working to build a coalition to support operations outside of the confines of Europe.
ESDI AND ESDP
One of the more controversial policies in NATO history has been the implementation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) which has led to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) for the European Union (EU). ESDI was unofficially launched by the NAC in January 1994. It was initially designed as a technical military arrangement that would allow the European side of the alliance to assume a greater share of the security missions, by giving the Western European Union and eventually the European Union more access to those NATO assets that it did not possess. 30 ESDI was also initiated to get alliance members to improve their military capabilities and promote interoperability among alliance members. ESDP is the EU policy to establish a EU military capability that would allow the EU to conduct its own operations outside of NATO. The EU established a "Headline Goal" for a 60,000 man European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) that can deploy in 60 days and be sustained for up to 1 year. This capability was intended to enable the conduct of effective EU led military operations, with or without NATO support, and to support NATO operations when required.
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Both ESDI and ESDP have been at the center of controversy for NATO for the past 4 years. Most of the critics agree that to allow more European autonomy could possibly cause the demise of NATO. When initially conceived, the ERRF was focused on peacekeeping and peacemaking operations so intervention within a 60 day timeframe could be seen as acceptable. With the advent of the GWOT and WMD proliferation this timeline is not likely to be responsive enough. 32 The current NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Force can deploy in less time with practically the same capability and the NRF, a work in progress, will be even more responsive and more lethal.
ESDP is seen by some as a political football that is clearly promoting EU autonomy and is an attempt to subvert U.S. leadership. This is certainly not true. ESDP is a part of EU Common
Foreign and Security Policy that outlines a EU military capability to project power. It is not in competition with NATO but is designed to compliment NATO capability and promote interoperability.
Another area seen as contentious is EU access to NATO military planning capabilities and intelligence assets. Most of the debate is focused the EU committing to a military action which requires the use of NATO military force or a capability. The fear is that the EU will require a separate command and control structure to plan operations that may detract from NATO capabilities. NATO has currently endorsed a plan for the EU to share NATO planning mechanisms, primarily operational planning at SHAPE, and adopt the NATO force planning
process. This will avoid redundancy and allow the EU to take advantage of NATO expertise.
Even with the current issues, ESDP is fully supported throughout NATO. The big test for ESDP and the EU will be how well the EU handles peacekeeping duties in Bosnia and Macedonia.
It is clear that NATO has seen the need for transformation since the end of the Cold War.
The implemented policy initiatives have attributed to the success of the alliance in its support of operations in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and most recently Afghanistan. As NATO continues to look toward the future and implement the initiatives outlined in the Prague Summit, it must remember to continue to support those policies that continue to remain viable, such as PFP, and continue to work with the EU within the construct of ESDP and Berlin Plus.
NATO'S ROLE IN DEFEATING TERRORISM
The Core of NATO's vision for the 21 st Century is deceptively simple. NATO embodies the transatlantic link between North America and Europe, the most successful alliance in history. As President Truman said when the Washington Treaty was signed, NATO safeguard's the peace and prosperity of our community of Nations. September 11 th has reinforced that purpose. NATO's core business, of defending the homelands of its members from attack is as important now as at any time since 1949. In this unpredictable and interconnected world, we all need alliances and partnerships to ensure our defense and security.
Speech by Lord Robertson November 2003 Immediately following the tragedy of 11 September, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty.
Article 5 states that "and armed attack against on or more of the NATO members shall be considered as an attack against them all." This move by NATO was more than a symbolic gesture to show support to the United States. It served as the catalyst for NATO to enter the fight against terror.
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The entire world changed dramatically after September 11 and NATO responded in kind to the increased asymmetric threat of terrorism. Although NATO was not initially called upon to participate in operations in Afghanistan, the support provided by NATO was critical to U.S. Summit has laid the groundwork for NATO transformation and the establishment of the ACT will
give NATO the ability to achieve transformation in concert with its most modernized member.
In addition the establishment of the NRF will give NATO a force capable of rapidly responding to the new asymmetric threats facing the free world today and in the future.
While NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism has already been significant, efforts are underway to better equip the Alliance and to allow it to play its full part in the longterm effort.
For the U.S. the gains for allowing NATO a greater role in the war on terror far outweigh the risk. The U.S. is already struggling financially in supporting this war unilaterally. American taxpayers will not allow the administration to raise taxes or continue to support funding reconstruction efforts in Iraq and other areas for very long. The U.S. needs NATO to offset the cost of this war and provide the forces to give our own military a chance to reconstitute and refocus.
While the United States is the world's sole remaining superpower, it cannot solve all problems on its own. Moreover, many of the challenges the United States faces-especially the war on terrorism-require cooperation with America's European allies and other partners on a broad range of issues that extend beyond the military realm. Hence, NATO will remain an essential forum for coordinating Euro-Atlantic strategic cooperation as well as a vehicle for developing the military capabilities to deal with both old and new challenges NATO needs to use its experience in recent operations to take on the role of a long-term peacekeeping and reconstruction force, and its support to ISAF is a good start. In addition NATO could assume a lead role in the security and reconstruction of Iraq. NATO could also play a major stability role by helping enforce the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Accord and reaching out to Arab Nations as part of the Partnership for Peace.
During the recent NATO conference at Colorado Springs, NATO officials outlined new strategies to turn the alliance into a potent machine for fighting terrorism. The two new proposals or means being discussed where: The creation of a NATO police branch modeled after the Italian Carabinieri.; and empowering NATO with the ability to commit the new NATO Response Force based on certain mission criteria created by the Alliance.
Establishing a NATO multinational military police force would provide a much needed force multiplier when dealing with reconstruction and security issues in operations such as Iraq. 35 The US military police are already stretched thin with no major force to relieve them when transitioning from combat to security and reconstruction operations. Also, by allowing the NATO headquarters to commit forces without going through a long and slow voting process the NRF will truly be able to respond as designed.
Finally, the time is now for the United States and NATO to mend any political fences and move toward a strengthening of this storied alliance. Throughout NATO's history the solidarity of the alliance has always been more important than the concern of any single country.
Terrorism threatens the entire world and will be a war that requires the cooperation and determination of all freedom loving people. In order for the world to succeed and to protect U.S. interests and preserve our way of life the U.S. must dedicate significant attention to the alliance and support it's transformation into a force capable of winning the Global War on Terrorism.
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